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Abstract 
We examine the effects of trading and information flows on the short-run behavior of 
stock prices by comparing the behavior of stock return volatility during trading and 
nontrading periods. We define nontrading periods as periods when exchanges and 
businesses are open but traders endogenously choose not to trade. After correcting for 
the bid/ask bounce and stickiness in quotes, we find that a large proportion of daily stock 
return volatility occurs without trades, especially for large firms. Furthermore, we 
provide new evidence that public (versus private) information is the major source of 
short-term return volatility. 
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1. Introduction 
To understand the effects of trading and information flows on short-run stock 
return volatility, a growing literature has examined the effects of market closures 
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on stock return dynamics. In an important study, French and Roll (1986) 
compare the behavior of volatility when exchanges are open to its behavior 
when exchanges are closed and demonstrate that ‘ . . on an hourly basis, the 
variance of returns when the exchanges are open is between 13 and 100 times 
larger, depending on the non-trading period being considered’ (other early 
empirical studies include Fama, 1965; Granger and Morgenstern, 1970; Oldfield 
and Rogalski, 1980; Christie, 1981). With the availability of diverse new data, 
empirical researchers have since conducted more detailed investigations of the 
behavior of stock returns during trading and nontrading periods in the U.S. and 
other countries.’ Similarly, theoretical researchers have developed strategic and 
competitive models of trading to explain the high (low) volatilities during 
exchange trading (nontrading) periods (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Foster 
and Viswanathan, 1990; and Slezak, 1992). 
In this paper, we use a new approach to analyze the effects of trading and the 
flow of public and private information on short-run volatility. Specifically, we 
define nontrading periods as periods when exchanges and businesses are open 
but traders endogenou.sly choose not to trade. Consequently, our trading and 
nontrading periods are comparable in two critical ways. First, since nontrading 
periods are not predictable, the information-gathering and trading activities of 
traders are not conditioned on their ability to trade. Second, since businesses are 
open, the activities which generate and release public information are un- 
changed. Thus, we can directly measure the relation between trading and 
volatility and, since volatilities in this analysis are likely to measure the (random) 
arrival of information without the confounding effects of agents adjusting their 
information-acquisition behavior, we can shed light on the relation between 
information flows and volatility. In contrast, nontrading periods in previous 
studies are predictable, exogenously-determined exchange closings, and the 
production and release of private and public information are likely to be altered 
during these periods.2 
We measure the relation between trading and volatility by comparing the 
return variances of nontrading and trading periods. We calculate nontrading to 
trading variance ratios for weekends (the ratio of the variance of returns from 
Friday’s close to’ Monday’s close when Mondays have no trades to the variance 
when Mondays have trades) and weekdays (the ratio of the variance of returns 
‘Studies of U.S. data include Amihud and Mend&on (1987), Foster and Viswanathan (1993a), and 
Stall and Whaley (1990). Studies of non-U.S. data include Amihud, Mendelson, and Murgia (1990), 
Barclay, Litzenberger, and Warner (1990), and Amihud and Mendelson (1991). 
*The study that is perhaps closest to our paper in design is the investigation of foreign exchange 
volatility during exchange trading versus nontrading hours by Harvey and Huang (1991). Given the 
worldwide trading of foreign exchange, the foreign exchange ‘market’ is effectively open 24 hours 
a day. Hence, even during the nontrading periods of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, there is 
trading on other international exchanges. 
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on weekdays that have no trades to the variance of weekdays that have trades). 
Following Jones and Kaul (1993), we adjust for several biases present in 
variance ratios of individual security returns. Specifically, we show that while 
the use of transaction prices causes variance ratios to be systematically biased, 
the use of bid/ask quotes could also lead to potential biases because market 
makers adjust quotes infrequently (see Geraghty, 1992). We provide estimates of 
variance ratios that correct for both the bid/ask bounce in transaction returns 
and the stickiness of quotes in quote-based returns. 
Our empirical analysis of NASDAQ-NMS stocks over the 1984-1991 period 
shows that a substantial proportion of daily stock return volatility occurs 
without trading. After correcting for the bid/ask bounce and stickiness in quotes, 
we find that the nontrading to trading variance ratios vary between 0.20 and 
0.30, or that between 20% and 30% of daily price movements occur in the 
absence of trading on days when exchanges and businesses are open. In addi- 
tion, the variance ratios for both weekdays and weekends increase monotoni- 
cally with firm size. For example, the median weekend nontrading to trading 
variance ratio for the largest firms is about 50% larger than for the smallest 
firms. Therefore, a substantially higher fraction of price movements of large 
versus small firms occurs without trades. 
We also use our nontrading and trading classification to assess the relative 
importance of public and private information in determining short-run volatil- 
ity. To do this, we consider two possible scenarios. First, assume that public 
information is produced at a constant rate on days when exchanges and 
businesses are open and is incorporated into asset prices without trading. Also, 
assume that the arrival of private information is stochastic and that trading is 
necessary for such information to influence prices. This scenario has been 
explicitly or implicitly assumed in several studies (see, for example, French and 
Roll, 1986; Hasbrouck, 1991). Under these circumstances, our nontrading to 
trading variance ratios have a straightforward economic interpretation: they are 
measures of the relative importance of public information in determining volatility. 
Alternatively, we assume that private information is a small (or negligible) 
fraction of the total flow of information and that public information might also 
lead to trading. Clearly, there are numerous corporate and macroeconomic 
public announcements every day, and there is ample evidence that such an- 
nouncements are associated with surges in trading. Moreover, several recent 
theoretical papers have shown that unexpected public announcements will lead 
to trading (see, for example, Foster and Viswanathan, 1993b; Kim and Verrec- 
chia, 1991). In fact, Harris and Raviv (1993) show that even without uny private 
information (and therefore without any information asymmetry) trading can 
occur due to differences in opinion (see also Varian, 1989). Under this alternative 
hypothesis, the nontrading to trading variance ratios have a different interpreta- 
tion: they measure the relative (random) flow of public information on nontrad- 
ing and trading days. 
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It is important to note that these extremely stylized hypotheses represent two of 
many potential patterns of information flow. In reality, it is likely that the flow of 
public information, the acquisition of private information, and trading interact in 
more complicated ways. Nevertheless, since these two assumptions are important 
benchmarks, examining their implications and gauging their relative merit provides 
vaiuable insight into the relation between information flows and volatility. For 
example, if the evidence supports the first hypothesis, our results on the relation 
between trading and volatility would suggest that while public information is a 
significant determinant of volatility, private information still plays a primary role. 
To distinguish between the two hypotheses, we examine market microstruc- 
ture characteristics within the context of our definition of nontrading. First, we 
use the approach in George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) to determine the 
relative size of the adverse-selection component of the bid/ask spread in our 
sample of securities. This analysis provides insight into the importance of 
private information (information asymmetry) in asset markets (see, for example, 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). We find that the adverse-selection component is 
a small fraction (12- 15 %) of quoted spreads. Second, and more importantly, we 
compare bid/ask spreads of securities on nontrading and trading days. If private 
information plays a dominant role in determining volatility, the bid/ask spreads 
on nontrading days should be smaller than spreads on trading days (see Easley 
and O’Hara, 1992). Conversely, if public information is the primary determinant 
of volatility, the adverse-selection component of spreads (and, ceteris paribus, 
quoted spreads themselves) should not only be small, but also equal, on trading 
and nontrading days. We find that the differences between the average bid/ask 
spreads on trading and nontrading days are economically insignificant, regard- 
less of the cross-sectional characteristics of the firms in our sample. 
Finally, we reexamine the effect of closed exchanges on volatility using our 
definition of nontrading. We show that either (a) public information is the 
primary determinant of volatility or (b) private information-gathering over 
a weekend is reduced by exactly the reduction in the flow of public information 
over a weekend. Given the implausibility of the symmetry in the flows of public 
and private information implied by (b), we conclude that private information is 
a small fraction of the total flow of information. Although the evidence from our 
individual tests could be consistent with more complicated models of informa- 
tion and trading, our empirical results taken together suggest that public (as 
opposed to private) information is the main determinant of short-term volatility. 
In Section 2 we describe the data and the statistical procedures used to 
compute the nontrading to trading variance ratios; this section also contains 
a brief discussion of the potential biases in variance ratios of individual secu- 
rities. We present and analyze our evidence on the relation between trading and 
volatility in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on the relation between information 
flows and volatility; we interpret our earlier results and present additional 
evidence. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data description 
We use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily master file for 
NASDAQ-NMS-firms to compute security returns. Following its inception in 
1982, trading on the NMS was initially limited to only the most actively-traded 
stocks. Hence, we use data from January 1984 to December 1991. We break up 
the eight-year sample period into 15 six-month (126-trading-day) subperiods 
and include all firms (except those that experience stock splits during a particu- 
lar subperiod) that have an unbroken series of closing bid/ask quotes. Since the 
NASDAQ-NMS tapes do not have any bid/ask quotes for February 1986, we 
drop this month and lose the last (sixteenth) subperiod because it is shorter than 
a 126-trading-day interval. 
We use the NMS sample because CRSP reports daily closing ‘inside’ bid/ask 
quotes on both trading and nontrading days. This procedure is distinctly 
different from the one used for NYSE/AMEX securities for which CRSP reports 
last-trade transaction prices on trading days, but the average of closing bid and 
ask quotes when no trades occur. We demonstrate in Section 2.5 that it is 
important to use closing quotes to calculate returns for both trading and 
nontrading days. 
A six-month sampling interval is chosen primarily to maximize the number of 
firm-observations; lengthening the subperiods results in the loss of a substantial 
number of firms because they do not have an unbroken series of daily quotes. 
Including such firms in the sample is particularly important for our study 
because these firms are also the ones that experience frequent nontrading. 
Another advantage of the subperiod analysis is that we can study the time-series 
patterns, if any, in the variance ratios. We sort all the sampled securities into 
five portfolios based on market value (number of shares outstanding times 
price per share) at the beginning of each subperiod. We use firm size as a 
proxy for the potentially different rates of acquisition and flow of information 
across different securities. All returns used in our analysis are continuously 
compounded. 
2.2. Some descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports some summary statistics for the firms in our overall sample, 
including market value (in millions of dollars), the average of closing bid and ask 
prices, dollar volume, number of transactions, and the percent bid/ask spread 
which is calculated as (PA - P,)/i(P, + PB), where PA and PB are the closing ask 
and bid prices. All reported numbers are based on daily observations and are the 
averages of the individual-firm estimates over the entire 1984-1991 sample 
period. 
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Table I 
Daily descriptive statistics of NASDAQ-NMS stocks, 1984-1991 
This table contains summary statistics on market value (number of shares outstanding times price 
per share), the average of closing bid and ask prices, dollar volume, number of transactions, and 
quoted spreads. The quoted spread, reported in percent, is calculated as (PA ~ PB),$(PA + Ps). 
where PA and PB are the ask and bid prices at the end ofeach day. The descriptive statistics are based 
on daily data and are reported for all securities and for securities belonging to five portfolios formed 
by rankings of market value of equity outstanding at the beginning of each six-month (126. 
trading-day) period. The individual-firm statistics are averaged across firms within each portfolio 
(and across all firms in the sample) for the entire 198441991 sample period. The second column 
reports the total number of observations for each portfolio and for the entire sample of firms used to 
calculate the summary statistics. 
Market Dollar 
value Average of volume Quoted 
No. of (in million bid/ask price (in million No. of spread 
Portfolio observations dollars) (in dollars) dollars) transactions (%) 
1 (smallest) 5495 8.913 4.894 24.248 4.273 II.647 
2 5492 2 1.760 8.133 70.201 7.845 6.686 
3 5490 43.478 Il.187 159.053 12.390 4.678 
4 5492 95.947 16.553 406. I 14 19.661 3.192 
5 (largest) 5483 474.834 2X.969 2402.4 18 52.754 1.834 
All firms 27452 128.866 13.941 61 1.789 19.173 5.609 
The numbers in Table 1 reflect the fairly diverse sample of securities used in 
this study. For example, average market values range between $9 million 
(portfolio 1) and $475 million (portfolio 5). Since Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1993) 
show that the volatility of daily returns is more closely related to the number of 
transactions than to volume, we report both average volume and number of 
transactions for securities in all portfolios. An important statistic is the quoted 
spread, which ranges between 1.83% and 11.65% and averages 5.61% for all 
firms in the sample. These spread estimates suggest that measurement errors in 
stock prices are likely to cause substantial spurious volatility in transaction 
returns because this volatility is directly related to the square of the proportional 
spread (see the Appendix). The spread estimates, in conjunction with the market 
values, also suggest that although our sample contains a wide range of securities, 
large firms are not well represented. For example, the average spread of 5.61% is 
substantially higher than the average of 2.82% for NYSE/AMEX firms at the 
end of 1988 (Keim, 1989, table 6, p. 96) mainly because the large firms on the 
NYSE with spreads of less than 1.00% are not represented in the NASDAQ 
sample. However, these large firms constitute approximately 25% of the NYSE/ 
AMEX sample used by Keim (1989); the remaining 75% of his firms (about 
1,800) display characteristics that are similar to the characteristics of the firms in 
our sample. 
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Table 2 
Relative frequency of nontrading by day-of-the-week for NASDAQ-NMS stocks, 198441991 
The estimates are calculated for each day of the week as the ratio of the number of nontrading days 
to the total number of days when the market is open. The ratios are calculated for every firm that has 
at least one trading day and one nontrading day for both Mondays and the Tuesday-Friday interval 
during a six-month (126-trading-day) subperiod. We report the averages of individual-firm ratios 
across all subperiods for securities belonging to five portfolios formed by rankings of market value of 
equity outstanding at the beginning of each subperiod. The second column reports the total number 
of observations for each portfolio over all subperiods used to calculate the average nontrading 
frequencies, and the third column shows the average market values of the securities. 
Market 
value Relative frequency of nontrading 
No. of (in million 
Portfolio observations dollars) Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
1 (smallest) 4505 8.213 0.317 0.309 0.312 0.3 14 0.318 
2 3430 20.036 0.245 0.229 0.239 0.237 0.243 
3 2479 40.231 0.211 0.196 0.198 0.199 0.210 
4 1757 88.811 0.184 0.171 0.177 0.178 0.182 
5 (largest) 707 275.198 0.145 0.129 0.133 0.130 0.136 
2.3. Frequency of nontrading 
Since we are interested in the behavior of stock return volatility on nontrad- 
ing and trading days, we sample securities from each market value portfolio that 
have at least one nontrading day and one trading day for both Mondays and the 
Tuesday-Friday interval during a six-month subperiod. Table 2 contains the 
relative frequencies of nontrading for these securities by day of the week to 
evaluate whether there are any systematic patterns in nontrading during the 
week. All estimates are averages of individual-firm values over all subperiods 
and are reported for all portfolios. The second column shows the total number 
of firm-observations used to calculate the reported averages. Note that the 
number of small firms is much greater than the number of large firms. This is not 
surprising because during a particular subperiod we require each security to 
have at least one nontrading Monday and one nontrading day during the 
Tuesday-Friday interval. As a consequence, the average market values of firms 
in each of the five portfolios drop in comparison to the original sample, 
“It is important to note that virtually none of the nontrading days in our sample are likely to have 
occurred due to trading halts. This is important because trading halts usually occur due to ‘excessive’ 
activity in a stock. Consequently, if a large proportion of our nontrading days were due to such halts, 
we would overestimate the volatility on nontrading days. However, King, Pownall, and Waymire 
(1991) show that trading halts typically last for less than two hours and almost never extend to the 
next day. 
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particularly for firms in portfolio 5 (see column 3). Nevertheless, the range of 
average market values in Table 2 ($8 million to $275 million) still covers the 
majority (about 70%) of NYSE/AMEX stocks. 
The estimates in Table 2 show that the frequency of nontrading is much 
higher for small firms: the proportions for portfolio 1 are more than twice the 
magnitudes for portfolio 5. Also, a wide range of nontrading frequencies is 
represented in the sample. However, within each portfolio there appears to be 
very little variation in the relative frequency of nontrading on different days of 
the week: formal F-tests cannot reject the hypothesis that nontrading for 
a security in a particular market-value portfolio occurs randomly during the 
week. This finding is encouraging from our perspective because it shows that 
nontrading is not a systematic phenomenon, limited to particular days of the 
week. Also, it provides some justification for treating all weekdays in the 
Tuesday-Friday interval as identical in calculating the ‘weekday’ nontrading 
and trading volatilities. 
2.4. Tfle volatifitv ratios 
In this paper, we distinguish between Mondays and the rest of the days in the 
week on which exchanges and businesses are open because Mondays follow 
a two-day exchange-and-business holiday. We calculate nontrading and trading 
variances using a procedure similar to the one used by Schwert (1990). Specifi- 
cally, we first estimate the following mean equation for each security’s return 
in each subperiod: 
5 
Ri, = 1 zik Dkt + Gt 3 
k=l 
(1) 
where Ri, is the return of security i on day t and the Dkr’s are the five 
day-of-the-week dummies used to capture differences in expected returns (see, 
for example, French, 1980; Keim and Stambaugh, 1984). We do not distinguish 
between nontrading and trading days in the mean equation (1). The purpose of 
estimating (1) is to extract any expected return movements, and since days of the 
week are perfectly predictable we use the five dummies. Since nontrading (or 
trading) days are ex ante unpredictable, however, we do not condition on the 
nontrading and trading dummies in the mean equation. 
The nontrading and trading volatility estimates for weekends (that is, Mon- 
days) and weekdays (Tuesday-Friday) are obtained by estimating the following 
regression: 
?i: = &M 2 DNTM~ + ciTM DTM~ f &VTTP DNTTF~ + ~?TTF DTTR 
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where .$ is the squared residual from (I), the dummy variable coefficients 
2 
OiNTM and ‘-+TM measure the intercepts for nontrading and trading Mondays, the 
coefficients ~&Trr and (~:rTr measure the daily nontrading and trading volatil- 
ities during the Tuesday-Friday interval, and oFIDH and ~f~r,~ measure the 
volatilities during one-day and three-day (long weekend) holidays. Since one- 
day and three-day holidays occur fairly infrequently, we do not distinguish 
between nontrading and trading days following these holidays. Nevertheless, 
since these holiday returns are likely to have different distributional character- 
istics than either Monday or other weekday returns, we use separate dummy 
variables for the one-day and three-day holidays. 
We use a two-step procedure to estimate (2): we first estimate (1) and then use 
the squared residuals, $‘s, as the dependent variable in (2) (see Davidian and 
Carroll, 1987). We use ordinary least squares to estimate (2) which provides 
consistent estimators of the parameters (see Pagan and Schwert, 1990). The 
estimators, however, are not efficient. Given the large sample of securities, we do 
not use weighted least squares to estimate (2) for each security.4 
We use the coefficient estimates of (2) to calculate the variance ratios for each 
security in each subperiod. The ratios of variances on nontrading and trading 
days when the exchanges are open are calculated for both weekends (that is, 
Mondays) and weekdays, and are denoted by VI and V,, respectively, where 
2 
OiNTM 
VI = 2 
and 
OiTM 
~2 _ $TTf 
GiTTF 
2.5. Methodological issues 
There are methodological problems associated with the use of variance ratios 
for individual securities, particularly with high-frequency (intraday or daily) 
data. In the Appendix we show that measurement errors in transaction prices 
bias the nontrading and trading variance ratios, VI and V2 in (3) toward 0.50. 
This bias, in turn, leads to problems in drawing inferences from variance ratios 
of individual securities. First, it is difficult to determine either the direction or the 
magnitudes of the biases for different ratios, because the biases depend not only 
on the degree of measurement error in transaction prices but also on the 
4We use the regression in (2) to calculate the nontrading and trading variances largely for 
convenience. Note that we have to use a regression to calculate the ‘mean’ returns because we 
condition on different days of the week in (1) and, in Section 2.5, we condition on lagged returns to 
adjust for stickiness in quotes in (4). Since nontrading and trading days are ex ante unpredictable, in 
estimating expected returns in (l), or in (4), we do not distinguish between these days. Consequently, 
it is convenient to also use a regression to calculate variances [see (2)] because, except for the 
nonconditioning of mean returns on nontrading and trading days, the regression approach in (2) is 
identical to calculating the nontrading and trading variances directly. 
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unobservable true variance ratios. Therefore, both the direction and the magni- 
tudes of the biases are likely to be different for different variance ratios. Second, 
and more importantly, the biases will tend to camouflage any systematic 
cross-sectional or time-series patterns in the true variance ratios. 
One possible way to eliminate the noise in transaction returns induced by 
bid/ask errors is to calculate returns based on the average of closing bid and ask 
quotes for both nontrading and trading days.’ These quotes are available for 
only NASDAQ-NMS securities. To provide some idea of the extent of the 
potential bias due to bid/ask errors, we calculate all variance ratios based on 
both transaction returns and quote returns. Note that transaction returns are 
particularly problematic in the context of our study because CRSP’s transaction 
price is a noisy measure of a security’s value on a trading day, but measures 
value without any bid/ask bounce on a nontrading day (since CRSP reports the 
average of bid and ask quotes as the transaction price on nontrading days). 
The use of quote returns would seem to eliminate this problem. However, 
quote-return-based variance ratios may themselves be biased. (We thank the 
referee, Ken French, for pointing out the potential problems associated with the 
use of quote returns for NASDAQ firms.) In a recent investigation of the 
quote-setting behavior of NASDAQ dealers, Geraghty (1992) finds that there 
are a large number of NASDAQ-NMS stocks whose bid and ask quotes remain 
unaltered from one day to the next, even if they experience trading. On average, 
over 50% of the securities on the NASDAQ have end-of-day inside market 
quotes unchanged from the previous day, and this proportion is about twice as 
large for the smallest-quintile versus largest-quintile firms. The stickiness in the 
quotes, in turn, leads to positive serial correlation in the quote returns of 
virtually all NASDAQ securities (see also Kaul and Nimalendran, 1990). 
If the stickiness in quotes is at least partly due to delayed adjustments by the 
market maker to marketwide or firm-specific information (see Jones, 1993) we 
need to correct for it. Consequently, we calculate an alternative set of variance 
ratios using quote returns conditioned not only on day-of-the-week dummies 
[see (I)], but also on five lagged own returns and the contemporaneous and five 
lagged returns on the market portfolio. Specifically, we estimate an altered form 
of (1): 
(4) 
5We assume that the true price of a stock changes over time only due to the arrival of new (public or 
private) information. Based on the findings of Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) we assume that 
irrational noise-trading or market overreaction does not generate any spurious volatility in shnrt- 
horizon returns of NASDAQ-NMS firms. Also, the bid/ask bounce is presumed to be the major 
source of measurement error(s) in transaction prices (see Blume and Stambaugh, 1983; Kaul and 
Nimalendran, 1990). 
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where R,, is the return on the value-weighted index of NYSE/AMEX stocks. 
Five lagged returns are chosen to coincide with a week’s worth of returns. To 
avoid data dredging we restrict ourselves to the lag specification in (4). Apart 
from capturing any lagged adjustments in quotes due to market effects, the 
contemporaneous and lagged market returns have the additional advantage of 
capturing the potential consequences of private information revealed through 
trades in one stock for other (possibly nontraded) stocks in the sample. We use 
the squared residuals obtained from estimates of (4) for individual securities to 
calculate the variance ratios defined in (3). 
Finally, since the sampling distributions of the variance ratios are highly 
asymmetric, we report the medians of the variance ratios of individual securities 
because they are more likely to represent the ratio of the typical firm in the 
cross-sectional samples. The medians are corrected for two problems inherently 
associated with variance ratios. First, in this paper, as in all previous papers 
studying exchange closings, the number of observations in the numerators of the 
variance ratios is less than the number in the denominators. This leads to 
a downward bias in the median, particularly for cases in which the number of 
observations in the numerator are small in absolute magnitude (see Merrington 
and Thompson, 1943). Second, because high-frequency returns are not normally 
distributed (see Fama, 1965), the variance ratios do not have an F-distribution. 
Consequently, it is difficult to analytically determine the extent of the downward 
bias in the medians of the variance ratios. We therefore use a bootstrap 
procedure to correct for the downward bias in the median estimates. The 
standard deviations of the medians are also calculated using a similar procedure. 
(Brief descriptions of the bootstrap procedures used to estimate the bias in the 
median estimators and to calculate their standard deviations are presented in 
the Appendix.) 
3. Trading and volatility 
In Table 3 we report the (bias-adjusted) median estimates of nontrading to 
trading variance ratios (that is, the ratios of variances on nontrading and trading 
days when business and exchanges are open). We report the ratios for both 
weekends (that is, Mondays) and weekdays. Panel A contains median ratios 
based on returns calculated using the average of the bid and ask prices, R", and 
panel B shows median ratios computed from transaction returns, R'. The 
numbers in parentheses below the medians are their (bias-adjusted) standard 
errors obtained from a bootstrap procedure (see the Appendix). The (bootstrap) 
sampling distributions of the median statistics closely approximate normality, 
which is not surprising because the distribution of the sample median is approx- 
imately normal in large samples (see DeGroot, 1989). Consequently, the (bias- 
adjusted) standard deviations of the sampling distributions can be used as 
Table 3 
Median ratios of nontrading to trading volatilities for NASDAQ-NMS stocks, 1984-1991 
The estimates are based on daily returns calculated using the average of closing bid and ask prices, 
R” (panel A), and transaction prices, R’ (panel B), for securities belonging to five portfolios formed by 
rankings of market value ofequity outstanding at the beginning of each six-month (l26-trading-day) 
period. All statistics are estimated for every firm that has at least one trading day and one 
nontrading day for both Mondays and the Tuesday-Friday interval during a subperiod. We first 
estimate the following regression for each security in each subperiod: 
t-:f = u&M D,vr,,.r, + &f Dr.+n + &TF &TV, + &-IF DTTF, + ~J’,L,H D,,,, + c?,,, DJDH~ + c’,, 1 
where $i: is the squared residual of the return of security i in period r conditional on day-of-the-week 
dummies, the dummy variable coefficients &,.,,, and CT&,,, measure the intercepts for nontrading and 
trading Mondays, the coefficients u&-rF an d CT&~ measure the intercepts when there is nontrading 
and trading on a particular day during the Tuesday-Friday interval, and rrfIDH and u:_rDH measure 
the intercepts for a one-day and a three-day (long-weekend) holiday. The nontrading to trading 
volatility ratios on weekends and weekdays are calculated as u~,rM/u~rM and U&~/C&~, respec- 
tively. We report the median estimate for each portfolio of the distribution of the individual- 
firm variance ratios over the entire 198441991 sample period. Median estimates of the two variance 
ratios are corrected for small-sample biases using a bootstrap procedure (see the Appendix). The 
numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the median statistics obtained from the bootstrap 
procedure. The second column reports the total number of observations for each portfolio over all 
subperiods used to calculate the median variance ratios. 
No. of Weekend 
Portfolio observations ratio 
Pam4 A: Using returns bawd on crrwagr of’ bid und ask prices, R” 
Weekday 
ratio 
1 (smallest) 4505 0.094 0.115 
(0.005) (0.002) 
2 3430 0.116 0.114 
(0.008) (0.003) 
3 2479 0.130 0.112 
(0.009) (0.004) 
4 1757 0.132 0.123 
(0.013) (0.005) 
5 (largest) 707 0.161 0.136 
(0.020) (0.007) 
Panel B: Using returns bused on transaction prices. R’ 
I (smallest) 4505 0.405 0.404 
(0.008) (0.004) 
2 3430 0.439 0.42 1 
(0.010) (0.005) 
3 2479 0.43 1 0.42 1 
(0.012) (0.006) 
4 1757 0.449 0.413 
(0.016) (0.007) 
5 (largest) 707 0.485 0.435 
(0.025) (0.012) 
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standard errors to conduct hypotheses tests. We also use the entire simulated 
sampling distributions of the medians (and calculate p-values) to confirm the 
validity of inferences based on the standard errors. Column 2 reports the total 
number of firm-observations over all subperiods used to estimate the median 
variance ratios for each portfolio. 
Both the weekend and weekday nontrading to trading variance ratios directly 
measure the relative importance of trading in the movement of stock prices. The 
estimates in panel A show that nontrivial proportions of price movements occur 
even in the absence of trading. However, the most interesting aspect of the 
evidence is that there is a systematic positive relation between the variance 
ratios and firm size. The weekend ratios increase from about 9% for the smallest 
firms to 16% for the largest firms, and the corresponding numbers for the 
weekday ratios are 12% and 14%. The medians of the largest firms (portfolio 5) 
are statistically significantly greater than those of the smallest firms (portfolio 1). 
The estimates in panel B show the dramatic effects of bid/ask bounce in 
transaction prices on the variance ratios, and how these effects can result in 
misleading inferences. There is a substantial (upward) bias toward 0.50 in both 
the weekend and weekday estimates, with the median ratios varying between 
0.40 and 0.49. The upward bias in these ratios occurs because the estimates in 
panel A are all less than 0.50, and the bias is proportionately much greater for 
the small firms. Therefore, the conventional use of transaction prices tends to 
camouflage any cross-sectional (or time-series) patterns in the true variance 
ratios. In the context of this paper, we see that the positive relation between firm 
size and the nontrading and trading variance ratios that is quite apparent in 
panel A is considerably attenuated in panel B. Also, measurement errors in 
transaction prices lead to the potentially erroneous conclusion that close to 50% 
of return volatility of all firms occurs without any trades. 
3.1. Variance ratios based on adjusted quote returns 
Table 3 shows that nontrading and trading variance ratios based on transac- 
tion returns appear to be implausibly large. However, the variance ratios based 
on quote returns in panel A could also be biased due to stickiness in the daily 
quotes of NASDAQ-NMS firms. We therefore present and analyze an alterna- 
tive set of nontrading and trading variance ratios based on quote returns 
adjusted for lagged own and market effects [see eq.(4)]. Table 4 contains median 
estimates of these variance ratios for all portfolios, with standard errors in 
parentheses. 
The most significant difference between the estimates based on the unadjusted 
and adjusted quote returns (see Table 3, panel A, as well as Table 4) is that the 
ratios are typically two to three times larger in Table 4. The nontrading to 
trading ratios for weekends range between 22% and 30% in Table 4 compared 
to values between 9% and 16% based on unadjusted quote returns in Table 3, 
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Table 4 
Median ratios of nontrading to trading volatilities using returns of NASDAQ-NMS stocks based on 
averages of closing bid and ask prices conditional on lagged own and market returns; 1984-1991 
The estimates are based on daily returns calculated using the average of closing bid and ask prices, 
R”, for securities belonging to five portfolios formed by rankings of market value of equity 
outstanding at the beginning of each six-month (126-trading-day) period. All statistics are estimated 
for every firm that has at least one trading day and one nontrading day for both Mondays and the 
Tuesday-Friday interval during a subperiod. We first estimate the following regression for each 
security in each subperiod: 
-z _ a,, - &TM D,,,v,, + &M DTM, + &VTTF D.vr TF~ + R’;.v &TF~ + o?,,, D,DH, + ~:JDH D,,,, + ~‘1, > 
where E^z is the squared residual of the return of security i in period t conditional on day-of-the-week 
dummies, five lagged own returns, and the contemporaneous and five lagged returns on the 
value-weighted index of NYSE/AMEX stocks; the dummy variable coefficients &,,, and 
z dipM measure the intercepts for Mondays when there is nontrading and trading, the coefficients 
IZJ&-~ and 6fTTF measure the intercepts when there is nontrading and trading on a particular day 
during the Tuesday-Friday interval, and ufIDH and u?~,, measure the intercepts for a one-day and 
a three-day (long-weekend) holiday. The nontrading and trading volatility ratios on weekends and 
weekdays are calculated as u$,,,+,/u~~, and ~,$r~~/u$~~, respectively. We report the median 
estimate for each portfolio of the distribution of the individual-firm variance ratios over the entire 
198441991 sample period. Median estimates of the two variance ratios are corrected for small- 
sample biases using a bootstrap procedure (see the Appendix). The numbers in parentheses are the 
standard errors of the median statistics obtained from the bootstrap procedure. The second column 
reports the total number of observations for each portfolio over all subperiods used to calculate the 
median variance ratios. 
Portfolio 




1 (smallest) 4505 0.220 0.191 
(0.007) (0.003) 
2 3430 0.265 0.214 
(0.010) (0.004) 
3 2479 0.263 0.237 
(0.0 12) (0.005) 
4 1757 0.282 0.248 
(0.017) (0.007) 
5 (largest) 707 0.303 0.290 
(0.028) (0.012) 
panel A. Similarly, the weekday ratios in Table 4 range between 19% and 29% 
compared to corresponding values of 12% to 14% in Table 3. pane1 A. Also, the 
variance ratios in Table 4 continue to show a systematic positive relation with 
size. In fact, this relation is even more pronounced than in Table 3; for both 
weekends and weekdays the ratios for the largest firms in portfolio 5 are about 
50% larger than the ratios for the smallest firms in portfolio 1. 
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3.2. Subperiod evidence 
In this section, we present evidence on the behavior of the nontrading to trad- 
ing variance ratios over time. For brevity we present details only for the 
overall sample and not for each portfolio. Figs. 1A and 1B plot the subperiod 
A. Weekend nontradingltrading 
0.00’ n ’ m ’ a ’ a s ’ m m 3 ’ ’ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 IQ 11 12 13 14 15 
Subperiods 
- Bid-ask -m-Transaction -- Adjusted B/A 
B. Weekday nontradinghrading 
7-----T 
E 
+j 0.50 . . _ _ . 
s 
. . . ,. - - -z _ . 1. . . . .- . . . . 
I ._ - 4, 
-. -._ 
---.----w-__C__._ 
0.00 I m m ’ ’ 1 ’ ’ n ’ m 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Subperiods 
- Bid-ask ..- Transaction -- Adjusted B/A 
Fig. 1. Bias-adjusted subperiod medians of variance ratios for all firms calculated using returns based 
on transaction prices and returns based on the average of closing bid and ask prices. Returns are 
conditioned on day-of-week dummies only, except for adjusted bid/ask ratios, which are calculated using 
returns conditioned on five past own returns, five past market returns, and the current market return. 
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bias-adjusted medians for the weekend and weekday nontrading to trading 
ratios, respectively. Each figure contains the bias-adjusted subperiod medians 
calculated from transaction returns (dotted lines), unadjusted quote returns 
(solid lines), and adjusted quote returns (dashed lines). Subperiod 8 contains the 
1987 stock market crash. 
The salient time-series feature of the subperiod weekend and weekday non- 
trading to trading ratios is their remarkable stability, regardless of the returns 
used to calculate the ratios. The stability of the medians computed from 
transaction returns is not surprising because they are consistently (upward) 
biased toward 0.50. However, except for differences in levels, even the ratios 
based on unadjusted and adjusted quote returns are stable through time. Note 
that the median estimates of the variance ratios may be relatively unreliable for 
the first three subperiods because there are less than 200 observations in each of 
these subperiods, while all other subperiods have between 600 and 1300 obser- 
vations. (The subperiod-l medians may be particularly unreliable because they 
are based on only 68 observations.) 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the stability of the nontrading to 
trading median ratios is that they do not even change during the 1987 crash 
subperiod. For example, the crash medians for the weekend and weekday ratios 
based on unadjusted quote returns are 0.111 and 0.100, with the corresponding 
noncrash medians being 0.115 and 0.117. The behavior of the crash median 
ratios is interesting because the average level of daily volatility during this 
subperiod was about two to three times higher than during the noncrash 
periods, depending on the size of the firm and the day of the week under 
consideration. Since the ratios of nontrading to trading volatilities remained the 
same during the crash subperiod, a substantial amount of volatility occurred 
without trade during this subperiod. 
The nontrading to trading variance ratios in Tables 3 and 4 are direct 
measures of the relation between trading and volatility and demonstrate that 
a substantial degree of volatility occurs without trading. Furthermore, the 
proportion of price movements that occur without trade is positively related to 
firm size. Given that large firms are widely followed by market participants, this 
evidence suggests that it may be easier for agents to concur on the implications 
of certain public events for large firms. 
4. Information flows and volatility 
We use our nontrading and trading classifications to gauge the relative 
importance of public versus private information. We consider two alternative 
assumptions about the flows of public and private information and their influence 
on trading. First, we follow previous researchers (see, for example, French 
and Roll, 1986; and Hasbrouck, 1991) and assume that public information is 
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produced at a constant rate on days when exchanges and businesses are open 
and that it affects prices without trade. The arrival of private information, on the 
other hand, is stochastic and trading is necessary for such information to affect 
prices. Under these conditions, the nontrading to trading variance ratios are 
measures of the relative importance of public information, and therefore our 
results in Section 3 suggest that although public information is a significant 
determinant of volatility, private information still plays a primary role. Alterna- 
tively, we assume that private information is a small (or economically negligible) 
fraction of all information and that public information induces trading. Under 
this scenario, the nontrading to trading variance ratios in Tables 3 and 4 appear 
to document wide fluctuations in the flow of public information. 
Clearly, these two scenarios are simple polar representations of potentially 
complex flows of information and intricate interactions between information and 
trading decisions. Furthermore, though our tests in this section provide evidence 
on which of the above scenarios more closely describes observed volatility, they 
do not rule out other explanations. Nevertheless, we use these two cases as 
benchmarks for assessing the relation between information flows and volatility. 
4.1. Importance qf private information 
We first estimate the adverse-selection components of bid/ask spreads of 
securities in our sample to measure the relative importance of private informa- 
tion. To test the predictions of strategic models of trading that the adverse- 
selection component will reflect patterns when markets are closed (such as 
weekends), we estimate the adverse-selection component for each day of the 
week.6 We calculate the adverse-selection component of the bid/ask spread 
using the’ procedure in George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991). Specifically, the 
adverse-selection component for security i on the jth day of the week, Hij,,is given 
by 
Oij = Sij - 2J - COV(RDij,, RDij(t_ 1)) , 
where sij is the average quoted spread in percent for security i on day j of the 
week, j = 1,. . . ,5, and RD,, is the difference between the weekly transaction and 
bid returns for day j in week t. 
‘Strategic models of trading show that private information could accumulate at the same rate during 
market closures as on a regular trading day, and yet weekend-to-weekday variance,ratios could be 
substantially lower than 3.0 as found by French and Roll (1986) (see also Section 4.3). This could 
occur if discretionary liquidity traders postpone their trades from Monday to the rest of the week 
due to the relatively acute asymmetry of information on Mondays. Under these circumstances, 
trading costs (in particular, the adverse-selection component of spreads) will be the highest on 
Mondays (see Foster and Viswanathan, 1990, 1993a; and also Kyle, 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer, 
1988). 
To gauge the relative importance of private information, we estimate the size 
of the adverse-selection component relative to the total quoted spread, that is, 
“ij=~ where Oduijd 1.0. (6) 
sij 
The statistic aij is a measure of the extent of private information in securities 
markets (and therefore the extent of information asymmetry). Note that if 
private information is the sole determinant of spreads, then aij equals one. On 
the other hand, if there is no private information in the market, uij equals zero. 
The extent of information asymmetry due to private information can therefore 
be measured by the relative magnitude of aii Finally, since clij is a unitless 
measure, it can be used to compare the extent of private information of large 
versus small securities (see Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Glosten, 1987; George, 
Kaul, and Nimalendran, 199 1). 
Since the estimation of Uij requires transaction prices and bid/ask quotes, we 
estimate both Hii’S and Uij’s for all NASDAQ-NMS securities that trade every 
day during a six-month subperiod. Consequently, the sample of securities is 
different from the one used to estimate the variance ratios reported in previous 
Tables. However, we categorize firms into five market-value portfolios using the 
same cutoffs as for the original sample. Any patterns found in the portfolio riij’S 
should therefore reflect the general patterns for securities in the corresponding 
market-value portfolios. As it turns out, this sample selection procedure prob- 
ably has no effect on our inferences because the Bij’s are constant across 
securities of different market value. 
Estimates of levels of the relative size of the adverse-selection component of 
spreads, in percent, are reported in Table 5. All estimates are averages of 
individual security estimates over all subperiods, with standard errors in paren- 
theses. In calculating both Hij’s and uij’s, we delete observations for which 
cov(RDijt, RDij,- i) is positive, and we set them equal to zero if its estimated 
value is negative. The standard errors are calculated under the assumption that 
the individual-firm parameters are independent and identically distributed with- 
in a particular portfolio. Since the parameters are likely to have positive 
cross-sectional correlation these standard errors are biased downward. 
The most important evidence in Table 5 is that the adverse-selection compo- 
nent is a small proportion (between 12% and 15%) of quoted spreads, regardless 
of the market values of the securities. On average, there appears to be relatively 
little private information in securities markets. The surprising aspect of the 
estimates in Table 5 is that the Bij’s are constant across large and small firms. 
Therefore, not only does private information play a small role in asset markets, 
but the relative importance of such information appears to be no higher for 
small than for large firms (see also George, Kaul, and Nimalendran, 1991). 
Finally, the extent of adverse selection is unchanged following market closures. 
The F-statistics cannot reject the equality of the adverse-selection components 
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Table 5 
Relative size of the adverse-selection component by day-of-the-week for NASDAQ-NMS stocks, 
198441991 
This table contains average estimates for each day of the week of the relative size (in percent) of the 
adverse-selection component of the bid/ask spread. The estimates are calculated for every firm that 
trades each day during a 126-trading-day subperiod. We report the averages of individual-firm 
statistics across all subperiods for securities belonging to five portfolios formed by rankings of 
market value of equity outstanding at the beginning of each six-month (126-trading-day) subperiod. 
The adverse-selection component is calculated as 0, = si - 2 - cov(RDi,, RD,,_ 1), where si is the 
quoted spread calculated as (PA - P,)/&P, + P,), where PA and P, are the daily closing ask and bid 
prices of security i, RD,, is the difference between returns based on transaction prices and returns 
calculated using bid prices, and cov(RD,, RD,,_ ,) for a particular day of the week is calculated using 
returns ending on that day of the week only (that is, using weekly returns ending on the weekday 
under consideration). We report average estimates of the relative size (in percent) of the adverse- 
selection component, i.e., a, = Bi/si for all days of the week. The numbers in parentheses below the 
averages are their standard errors under the assumption that the individual-firm parameters are 
independent and identically distributed. ln the last column we report F-statistics (with p-values in 
brackets) to test the hypothesis that the adverse-selection components are equal across all days of 
the week. The second column reports the total number of observations for each portfolio over all 
subperiods used to calculate the reported averages. 
No. of F 
Portfolio observations Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday [p-value] 
1 (smallest) 385 14.80 
(1 .OO) 
2 1009 14.03 
(0.58) 
3 1808 15.41 
(0.42) 
4 2626 14.79 
(0.35) 




















































on different days of the week for portfolios l-4 (see last column, Table 5); the 
p-values range between 0.27 and 0.76. Consistent with the evidence in Foster 
and Viswanathan (1993a), for the large firms in portfolio 5 there is statistically 
significant variation in the adverse-selection component. The economic signifi- 
cance of this variation, however, appears to be questionable because the point 
estimate of Monday’s adverse-selection component is only marginally higher 
than Tuesday’s and is actually lower than both Wednesday’s and Thursday’s 
estimates. Consequently, the evidence in Table 5 provides little support for 
asymmetric information models which suggest that (relative to a normal day) 
there is an excess accumulation of private information when markets are closed. 
Moreover, none of the portfolios show any systematic variation over different 
days of the week in the levels of the quoted spreads. 
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4.2. Market microstructure q&c.ts on nontraling and trcrding cloys 
The preceding analysis suggests that since the adverse-selection component of 
quoted spreads is small for all securities, private information on uverage may not 
be a major source of short-run price changes. However, the adverse-selection 
and quoted bid/ask spreads in Table 5 are unconditional estimates; they do not 
distinguish between trading and nontrading periods. If public information is the 
sole determinant of short-run volatility and, therefore, the substantially higher 
variances on trading days are due to a higher flow of such information, the 
adverse-selection component of bid/ask spreads should be close to zero for both 
trading and nontrading days. Conversely, if trading is due solely to private 
information, the adverse-selection component during trading days would be 
greater than during nontrading days.7 Consequently, a comparison of the 
adverse-selection components of spreads on nontrading and trading days 
should help us distinguish between our two stylized representations of the 
relation between information flows and trading. 
Recall, however, that we require closing quotes und transaction prices (parti- 
cularly the latter) to calculate the adverse-selection component of the spreads 
(see Glosten, 1987; Stall, 1989; George, Kaul, and Nimalendran, 1991). Since 
only closing quotes are available on nontrading days, we cannot calculate the 
adverse-selection component for these days. However, since order-processing 
costs are likely to be constant across different days, and there is virtually no 
extant evidence of inventory-holding costs (see Stall, 1989; George, Kaul, and 
Nimalendran, 1991) differences in the quoted spreads themselves should indi- 
cate differences in the adverse-selection component. Thus, if trading days are 
associated with an increase in the flow of private information and, therefore, an 
increase in adverse selection, the quoted spreads should be higher on trading 
days than on nontrading days. 
Average estimates of the quoted spreads on nontrading and trading days are 
reported in Table 6. Since we do not require transaction prices and quotes to be 
available each day, the sample used to calculate the spreads is identical to the 
one used to estimate the nontrading to trading variance ratios in Tables 3 and 4. 
The numbers in parentheses below the average estimates are their standard 
errors calculated under the assumption that individual-security quoted spreads 
are independent and identically distributed within a particular portfolio. The 
last column contains t-tests (with p-values in parentheses) of the hypothesis that 
the bid/ask spreads are equal on nontrading and trading days. 
‘In a recent paper, Easley and O’Hara (1992) explicitly model the effects of time on stock prices and 
spreads in a world with asymmetric information. They show that the absence of trade during 
a particular period will lead to a lowering of the spread by the market-maker. This occurs because 
the absence of trade is also informative (to the market-maker) in that it is more likely to occur when 
no (private) information event has occurred. 
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Table 6 
Relative bid/ask spreads on nontrading and trading days for NASDA Q-NMS stocks, 1984-1991 
This table contains average estimates of the quoted bid/ask spreads on nontrading and trading days. 
The estimates are based on daily spreads for securities belonging to five portfolios formed by 
rankings of market value of equity outstanding at the beginning of each six-month (126-trading-day) 
period. The spreads are calculated for every firm that has at least one trading day and one 
nontrading day for both Mondays and the Tyesday-Friday interval during a subperiod. The quoted 
spread of a firm, s,, is calculated as (Pa - PB)/f(Pa + P,), where P, and Ps are the daily closing ask 
and bid prices of firm i. The numbers in parentheses below the averages are their standard errors 
under the assumption that the individual-firm parameters are independent and identically distrib- 
uted. In the last column we report t-statistics (with p-values in brackets) to test the hypothesis that 
the average bid/ask spreads are equal on nontrading and trading days. The second column reports 






































The evidence in Table 6 shows that although quoted spreads are actually 
consistently lower on trading days, the differences in spreads are economically 
trivial for securities belonging to all portfolios. Specifically, the differences are 
only 4% to 6% of the quoted spreads on trading days. We arrive at similar 
conclusions if we calculate the means (or medians) of the ratios of spreads on 
nontrading and trading days. This evidence again appears to be consistent with 
the hypothesis that private information plays a small role in asset markets; 
changing flows of public information appear to be the main source of differences 
in volatility on trading and nontrading days. 
4.3. The Qfects qf exchange closings on volatility 
We conduct a final set of tests to gauge the relative importance of private 
versus public information. We use our nontrading and trading classification 
to compare the relative weekend-to-weekday nontrading volatilities with the 
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relative weekend-to-weekday trading volatilities. Specifically, we use the esti- 
mates of (2) to calculate the following variance ratios: 
These ratios are similar to weekend-to-weekday variance ratios calculated by 
earlier researchers (see, for example, French and Roll, 1986) except that we 
compute separate ratios based on our definition of nontrading. Thus, ratio V3 
compares the variance of returns from Friday to Monday when no trades occur 
on Monday to the average variance of returns on a weekday when no trade 
occurs on the weekday. Ratio V, is the same weekend-to-weekday variance 
ratio when trades do occur on both the Mondays and the weekdays. 
Consider the conditions necessary for ratios V3 and V, to be equal. If V3 
reBects only the flow of public information and V, reflects the flow of both 
public and private information, these two ratios can be equal only if (a) public 
information is the primary determinant of volatility or (b) private information 
gathering over a weekend is reduced by exactly the reduction in the flow of 
public information over a weekend. We find that the ratios are, in fact, equal 
and, given the implausibility of the second condition, our interpretation of this 
evidence is that private information is a small fraction of the total flow of 
information. 
Our test of this hypothesis is shown in Table 7, which presents the bias- 
adjusted median estimates of the weekend nontrading and trading variance 
ratios based on adjusted quotes. For brevity, we only report variance ratios 
based on adjusted quotes because ratios based on transaction prices are biased 
toward one and unadjusted quotes are sticky. The numbers in parentheses 
below the median estimates are their (bias-adjusted) standard errors. 
Table 7 demonstrates that within each market-value portfolio the weekend- 
to-weekday nontrading and trading variance ratios are similar. We also conduct 
a formal test of the hypothesis that the median weekend nontrading and trading 
variance ratios, V3 and V4, are identical for securities in each portfolio using 
a bootstrap procedure described in the Appendix. These tests typically cannot 
reject the hypothesis that V3 and V, are equal, regardless of the market values of 
the securities: the p-values of the test statistics are consistently greater than 1 %, 
and only the median ratios for portfolio 2 are different at the 5% significance 
level. 
Taken together, the evidence presented in Tables 5-7 suggests that private 
information contributes little to observed volatility. However, we have only 
considered two simple characterizations of the relation between information 
flows and trading, and other, more complex, hypotheses could be consistent 
with our results. 
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Table I 
Median ratios of weekend-to-weekday volatilities using return of NASDAQ-NMS stocks based 
on average of closing bid and ask prices conditioned on lagged own and market returns, 1984-1991 
The estimates are based on daily returns calculated using the average of closing bid and aks prices, 
R”, for securities belonging to five portfolios formed by rankings of market value of equity 
outstanding at the beginning of each six-month (126-trading-day) period. All statistics are estimated 
for every firm that has at least one trading day and one nontrading day for both Mondays and the 
Tuesday-Friday interval during a subperiod. We first estimate the following regression for each 
security in each subperiod: 
i; = uf,,&# &I-M, + &M D,,, + &r~ DNTTF, + &F D,,,, + dm Dmw, + &H Dam, + u,, 9 
where t:z is the squared residual of the return of security i in period t conditional on day-of-the-week 
dummies, five lagged own returns, and the contemporaneous and five lagged returns on the 
value-weighted index of NYSE/AMEX stocks; the dummy variable coefficients ufNTM and 
ubM measure the intercepts for Mondays when there is nontrading and trading, the coefficients 
&-rF and crfTTF measure the intercepts when there is nontrading and trading on a particular day 
during the Tuesday-Friday interval, and ofIDH and ofJDH measure the intercepts for a one-day and 
a three-day (long-weekend) holiday. The nontrading and trading volatility ratios on weekends and 
weekdays are calculated as c&,/u&,,, and uz INTTF/&TF. We report the median estimate of the 
distribution of the individual-firm variance ratios over the entire 198441991 sample period. Median 
estimates of the two variance ratios are corrected for small-sample biases using a bootstrap 
procedure (see the Appendix). The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the median 
statistics obtained from the bootstrap procedure. The second column reports the total number of 








1 (smallest) 4505 0.939 0.885 
(0.027) (0.021) 
2 3430 0.992 0.924 
(0.030) (0.028) 
3 2419 0.958 0.93 1 
(0.038) (0.033) 
4 1751 0.996 0.953 
(0.034) (0.035) 
5 (largest) 707 0.880 1.026 
(0.061) (0.050) 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we use a new approach to evaluate the flows of public and 
private information and their relation to short-run volatility. We analyze and 
compare the volatilities of returns during trading and nontrading periods, where 
nontrading periods are periods when exchanges and businesses are open but 
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traders endogenously choose not to trade. In contrast, nontrading periods in 
previous studies coincide with exchange closings that are exogenously imposed 
and ex ante perfectly predictable. 
Our definition of nontrading leads to several interesting findings. First, 
trading does not appear to be necessary to explain a significant proportion of 
the observed variance of stock returns once the returns have been adjusted for 
day-of-the-week effects, bid/ask bounce, and stickiness in quotes. An interesting 
aspect of the cross-sectional variation in the nontrading to trading ratios is that 
they are positively related to firm size: a significantly larger proportion of the 
return volatility of large firms occurs without trade. Given that large firms are 
actively followed by many market analysts, it may be easier for agents to 
decipher and agree upon the implications of certain types of public events for 
such firms. Therefore, prices of large firms may move more easily without trades. 
Second, a detailed analysis of market microstructure effects and weekend- 
to-weekday variance ratios using our definition of nontrading suggests that 
public information may be the major determinant of short-run volatility. [Har- 
vey and Huang (1991) reach a similar conclusion regarding the volatility of 
foreign exchange rates]. For example, despite the existence of a statistically 
identifiable adverse-selection component in quoted spreads, the economic mag- 
nitude of this component appears to be small. Also, the adverse-selection 
component does not appear to vary between trading and nontrading days when 
exchanges and businesses are open, nor is it significantly higher following 
periods when markets are closed. Clearly, the results of each of the tests 
conducted in this paper could be consistent with more complex models of public 
and private information than the ones considered here. Nevertheless, when 
considered together, the evidence suggests that public information is the major 
source of short-run stock price volatility. 
Appendix 
This appendix is largely based on the analysis in Jones and Kaul (1993) and 
contains a brief discussion of potential biases in variance ratios and the proce- 
dures used to correct these biases. 
Suppose bid/ask errors are the only source of measurement errors in transac- 
tion prices. It is well known (see Roll, 1984) that the variance of observed 
(continuously-compounded) transaction returns, R:,, is spuriously biased up- 
ward by .$/2, where si is the proportional spread of the security. The use of 
transaction prices, however, also leads to biased estimators of the ratios of 
variances frequently used in the literature. Specifically, in the context of this 
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paper, consider the weekend and weekday nontrading to trading variance ratios, 
VI and I’/2 [see Eq. 31. For simplicity, assume that all nontrading days are 
preceded by trading days. The measured variance ratios calculated from trans- 
action prices can be written as 
Vy = &TM + (s?/4) 
and V$‘= 
&TTF + (s?/4) 
&M + (s?/2) &TF + (s2/2) 
64.2) 
The spurious volatilities in the denominators of V’: and P’f are twice those in 
the numerators because of CRSP’s policy of reporting transaction prices on 
trading days and the average of bid/ask quotes on nontrading days. Although 
both Vy and V$ will be biased toward 0.50, the direction and magnitude of the 
bias is ambiguous because the bias is upward (downward) when the true 
unobservable ratios are less (greater) than 0.50. 
A potentially simple way to eliminate the noise in transaction returns due to 
bid/ask errors is to use the average of the closing bid/ask quotes of NASDAQ- 
NMS securities to calculate returns for both nontrading and trading days. 
Geraghty (1992), however, shows that NASDAQ market makers very frequently 
do not change quotes even if trades occur. To correct for the stickiness in quotes 
we therefore calculate an alternative set of estimates of all the variance ratios by 
conditioning the quote returns of each security on five lagged own returns and 
contemporaneous and five lagged returns of the market index [see (4) in 
Section 2.51. 
A.2. Bias adjustments for the median variance ratios 
There is an additional bias associated with the distribution of the variance 
ratio statistic. This bias results from the fact that the F-distribution presumed 
for variance ratios is sensitive to normality and the relative sample sizes of the 
numerator and denominator of the ratios. Specifically, the medians of the 
sampling distributions of the variance ratios will be biased downward if the 
sample sizes of the numerators are smaller than those of the denominators, and 
the extent of the bias is sensitive to the assumption of normality of returns. We 
therefore employ a resampling simulation technique inspired by the bootstrap 
method (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1986). Specifically, we estimate the bias by 
resampling under the null hypothesis that the true variances in the numerator 
and the denominator are equal. The departure of the simulated median variance 
ratios from unity provides an estimate of the bias in the median of the computed 
variance ratios. 
The following brief discussion refers to the weekend nontrading to trading 
ratio; the procedure for the weekday ratio is analogous. For each firm, during 
each 126-trading-day subperiod we calculate the actual number of Monday 
nontrading and trading days, NMMNT and N MT, respectively. We then resample 
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independently for each firm from its 126 squared residuals in a particular 
subperiod. The resampling is done with replacement NMNT times from the actual 
Mondays for the numerator and N MT times for the denominator, and we 
calculate the variance ratio based on the resampled values. We then calculate 
the median of the simulated variance ratios across all firms and subperiods. 
Medians calculated from 200 independent replications form the empirical cumu- 
lative density function (CDF) for the median statistic, under the assumption that 
the variances in the numerator and denominator are identical. We average the 
simulated cross-sectional medians and use these averages to correct for the 
downward bias in the sample medians. Specifically, median estimates reported 
in the paper are the uncorrected sample median estimates divided by the 
averages of the simulated medians. All simulations for the weekend-to-weekday 
(nontrading and trading) ratios reported in Table 7 are performed using similar 
but distinct algorithms (see Jones and Kaul, 1993). 
A.3. Calculution qf‘ the standard errors of’ the mrdians 
To conduct hypotheses tests on the bias-adjusted medians, we calculate 
standard deviations of the medians under the assumption that the true variances 
in the numerator and denominator are equal. We simulate the empirical CDF of 
each variance ratio by resampling with replacement from the 126 days, and do 
this once for each of 200 replications for each subperiod. For each security, 
we use the squared residuals and the trading/nontrading distinction on the 
resampled days to calculate the variance ratios (this helps account for any cross- 
sectional correlation in the individual-firm variance ratios). The standard devi- 
ations of the empirical CDF’s, however, are biased downward because the 
medians themselves are biased. We therefore adjust the standard deviations 
(upward) by dividing them by the same bias-correction factors that are used to 
adjust the median estimates. 
Finally, the tests for the equality of the weekend-to-weekday trading and 
nontrading variance ratios are performed using a similar algorithm. The empiri- 
cal CDF’s of the two median variance ratios are calculated using the bootstrap 
technique described above. Statistical significance at level r for testing the 
equality of the median variance ratios then implies that (1 - c(/2) of the indepen- 
dent replications resulted in Q = V3 - V4 of the same sign. 
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